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ANALYSIS
Moldova in the EU's 
Eastern Partnership
Lessons of a Decade
In Moldova, the weakness of the Eastern Partnership has been 
over-reliance on incentives, rather than a lack thereof. Veto players 
who hid their true interests by claiming allegiance to the European 
cause hijacked the EU’s soft power. The EaP’s shortcoming was lack 
of means and readiness to make these key opponents of political 
reforms keep their commitments. Its core challenge is how to over-
come the resistance of these veto players who have been obstructing 
transformational goals. 
 – The EU should prioritize and insist on its transformational goals 
over geopolitical concerns in its dealings with Moldova’s leaders, in 
particular with regard to the rule of law and the survival conditions 
for genuine democratic forces.
 – The EU should employ sanctions earlier, more flexibly, and more 
toughly – including by withholding financial aid, gradual suspen-
sion of the Association Agreement, and personal sanctions – in 
response to major corruption or democracy and the rule of law 
violations.
 – The EU and its member states should build up their intelligence and 
prosecution capabilities in order to understand corrupt interests, 
networks, and influences in Moldova’s politics and to prosecute cor-
rupt schemes where there is jurisdiction in the EU.
 – The EU should extend its conditionality and involvement wherever 
reforms can be blocked, from legislation to implementation, includ-
ing appointments in institutions. EU missions could monitor and 
implement reforms, in particular in the justice sector. 
Dr. Dr. Martin Sieg
Associate Fellow DGAP, 
Director of the offices of the 
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in 
Romania and the Republic of 
Moldova
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Once considered the success story of the Eastern 
Partnership (EaP), Moldova has become an example 
of the problems encountered by the EU’s initiative. The 
EaP has suffered fundamental backlashes in the coun-
try in terms of oligarchic state capture and its legacy, 
including a strengthening of pro-Russian forces. 
In contrast to the successful transformations that ac-
companied EU enlargement in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope, the EaP has been marked by the lack of a mem-
bership perspective and far stronger opposition from 
Russia to European integration in the post-soviet 
space. However, both factors fall short in explaining 
its lack of success in Moldova. 
The analogy with earlier enlargements and their con-
ditions for reforms and integration does not seem to 
be applicable to realities in Moldova. The key chal-
lenge has been that oligarchic structures and corrupt 
interests created powerful veto players whose inter-
ests were fundamentally opposed to reforms toward 
strengthening democracy, rule of law, and a market 
economy. 
The EU faced such players not only or predominantly 
in the pro-Russian camp. They also held power under 
“pro-European” governments, culminating in the re-
gime of Vlad Plahotniuc from 2016 to 2019, which saw 
the worst abuses of power with regard to democracy 
and the rule of law. Further deterioration could only 
be stopped when an unlikely alliance between the 
genuine pro-European opposition and pro-Russian 
forces under President Igor Dodon brought down Pla-
hotniuc’s regime.
In the short run, geopolitical interests within the EU 
contradicted its transformational goals, whereas in 
the long run both can only succeed together. Cor-
rupt actors in the “pro-European” camp exploited the 
threat of a takeover by pro-Russian forces to distract 
from a lack of reforms and to refocus the attention of 
the pro-Western electorate and of EU actors, playing 
off their geopolitical concerns against their transfor-
mational goals. Russian influence strengthened the 
veto power of corrupt interests. Yet, concerns about 
pro-Russian forces coming to power brought this 
about rather than prevented it. 
Actors such as Plahotniuc claimed to be pro-European 
to mitigate their lack of democratic legitimacy by pre-
senting themselves as guardians of a European ori-
entation. At the same time, they weakened genuine 
pro-European forces and strengthened the pro-Rus-
sian camp. By associating themselves with it, they 
also discredited the EU in large parts of the popula-
tion. The strengthening of pro-Russian forces was the 
consequence of the European cause becoming asso-
ciated with corruption and abuse of power. Only the 
survival of a pro-European opposition prevented this 
turn from becoming irreversible.
The lesson from the experience the EaP in Moldova 
is not that it lacked incentives such as EU member-
ship. The incentives were, in fact, so strong that gov-
ernments and corrupt actors alike sought legitimacy 
by claiming or pretending to be pro-European. In fact, 
the EaP was over-reliant on incentives. These may 
have even worked against change as leaders used the 
promise of integration to compensate for not deliv-
ering reforms. In this way, the EU’s soft power under-
lying the EaP’s incentives was hijacked by status quo 
interests – helping them to extend and maintain their 
power – and to be turned against the EaP’s transfor-
mational goals.
In this respect, lack of hard power has been the short-
coming of the EaP. The key challenge has been how to 
overcome the veto power of corrupt interests and to 
ensure compliance. This will require of the EU greater 
willingness and means to respond to violations of com-
mitments undertaken in the Association Agreement. 
So far, the conditions for the success of the EaP have 
deteriorated. To improve its chances, the EU should 
prioritize its transformational goals over concerns re-
garding geopolitics or stability. Political actors ought 
to be assessed by their respective business models in-
stead of geopolitical claims. EU conditionality needs 
to become tougher and focus on the conditions for the 
survival and ability to compete of genuine democratic 
forces.  The EU should be ready to reduce and eventu-
ally suspend the existing framework of relations un-
der the Association Agreement in case of noncom-
pliance. And it should be equally ready to employ 
sanctions against corrupt interests and to get more 
directly involved in implementing reforms.
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INTRODUCTION
Once considered its success story, the Republic of 
Moldova may have become a typical example of the 
problems encountered by the Eastern Partnership 
(EaP) of the EU. Launched in 2009 as an upgrade of 
the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), its core 
concept was to offer economic integration as incen-
tive for reforms toward more democracy and rule 
of law in post-soviet Eastern Europe. A key aim has 
been “to promote a ring of well-governed states” 
around the EU as part of its security strategy.1 Like 
the ENP, the EaP was from the onset shaped by two 
compromises: between the geopolitical and trans-
formational interests of the EU, and between most-
ly Western European EU members wary of further 
enlargement and conflicts with Russia and mostly 
Central and Eastern ones interested in further inte-
gration eastward.
As a consequence, the EaP lacks an explicit EU mem-
bership perspective. Although more limited in its 
offers and different in procedure than earlier en-
largements, the EaP’s logic and design was taken 
from these. The core design consisted of a deep and 
comprehensive free-trade area (DCFTA) – far-reach-
ing economic integration – as the strategic offer and 
visa liberalization as a medium-term deliverable. 
In return countries were to commit themselves to 
far-reaching reforms in the political parts of Asso-
ciation Agreements with the EU. As with earlier en-
largements, the underlying presumption was that 
the EU and local political elites had common agen-
da over moving toward a market economy and liberal 
democracy based on the rule of law and independent 
institutions.
Today, more or nearly the same amount of time has 
passed since the launch of the ENP and the EaP than 
it took for the process leading to the enlargements 
of 2004 and 2007. That Association Agreements 
could only be concluded with Georgia, Moldova, 
and Ukraine is due to geopolitical impediments or 
the lack of a minimum of democratic preconditions 
in the other EaP countries. However, even in these 
three cases there has not been reform to any extent 
similar to that in any enlargement country. One ar-
gument for why is Russia’s opposition, which was of 
marginal relevance in enlargement countries. A sec-
ond argument is the lack of a membership perspec-
1 Council of the European Union, “European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a better World”, Brussels 2003, p. 10:  
<http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15895-2003-INIT/en/pdf> (accessed July 3, 2020).
2 Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Eastern Partnership policy beyond 2020 (May 11, 2020):  
<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/43905/st07510-re01-en20.pdf> (accessed July 3, 2020).
tive, taking the EaP’s shortcoming to be a failure to 
provide sufficient incentive.
Moldova’s case suggests another explanation: that 
the enlargement experience is generally not applica-
ble. The key difference is that, before the launch of 
the ENP and the EaP, oligarchic structures and sys-
temic corruption had created strong elite veto play-
ers whose interests have been opposed to the EU’s 
transformational goals. Therefore, and despite their 
pro-European claims, the most powerful local actors 
did not share a reform agenda with the EU. Integra-
tion was a strong incentive within society but, in-
stead of becoming a motor for change, this kind of 
EU soft power was hijacked by oligarchic actors to 
legitimize their power and prevent change. Interfer-
ence by Russia seems to be only of secondary rele-
vance in forestalling the success of the EaP. Its most 
important effect has probably been to enable oligar-
chic actors to play off the EU’s geopolitical concerns 
against its transformational goals. In Moldova, the 
question of how to make the EaP a success has not 
been about incentives but how to overcome the re-
sistance of local veto players.
The EU has recently adopted its “beyond 2020” ob-
jectives for the EaP, emphasizing direct benefits to 
peoples and societies but reaffirming its focus on 
good governance, democracy, the rule of law and 
fighting corruption.2 It may also need a bolder ap-
proach toward governments and leaders, less in 
terms of offers and incentives but rather of how to 
employ its leverage to ensure compliance with com-
mitments undertaken under the EaP.
THE POLITICAL EVOLUTION OF 
MOLDOVA DURING THE EAP
A New Hope 
When the Eastern Partnership was launched in 2009, 
the Party of Communists (PCRM) under President 
Vladimir Voronin governed Moldova. The EU and 
the more pro-Western citizens viewed his regime as 
semi-authoritarian. His relationship with Russia had 
become more strained and that with the EU closer; 
however, he had avoided commitments to either side 
that could weaken his power. 
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Voronin’s regime looked increasingly anachronis-
tic after the Rose Revolution in Georgia and the Or-
ange Revolution in Ukraine. When in the same year 
his rule was replaced by the first explicitly pro- 
European coalition, this was seen as a new start 
toward a European future. Integration was backed by 
an overwhelming majority of the population.3 It was 
also supported in principle by the PCRM. Igor Dodon, 
while minister of the economy under Voronin, had 
championed speedy rapprochement with the EU.
The new ruling coalition called itself the Alliance 
for European Integration (AIE), demonstrating that 
the claim to follow the EU model had become a 
key source of political legitimacy. However, it con-
sisted of parties diverse within and between them-
selves, and was built on compromises between old 
establishment figures and new leaders, reform goals 
and status quo interests. Its most popular constitu-
ent was the Liberal Democratic Party (PLDM), led by 
Prime Minister Vlad Filat. A businessman who em-
bodied contradictions between special interests 
3 Institutul de Politici Publice, “Barometer of Public Opinion,” November 2009:  
<http://ipp.md/old/public/files/Barometru/2009/final_bop_noiembrie_2009_recap.pdf> (accessed July 3, 2020), p. 109.
4 Kálmán Mizsei, “The New East European Patronal States and the Rule-of-Law,” in Stubborn Structures: Reconceptualizing Post-Communist Regimes, ed. 
Balint Magyar (Budapest, 2019), pp. 531-610, 566-572.
and reforms, he built a strong team of personalities 
who were or appeared to be reform-minded, which 
helped him establish the PLDM as the most credible 
pro-European party.
The second partner, the Democratic Party (PDM), 
rose to new relevance when it was taken over by 
two key figures who switched from the PCRM to the 
pro-European camp. Marian Lupu became its new 
president. Vlad Plahotniuc, Moldova’s only true oli-
garch due to his proximity to Voronin, joined the 
PDM when he saw the latter’s power crumbling. He 
provided the party with superior resources and be-
came its true leader, later its president.4 The third 
and smallest partner, the Liberal Party (PL), mainly 
represented the moderate pro-Romanian electorate. 
Led by Mihai Ghimpu, it benefitted largely from the 
popularity of Chisinau Mayor Dorin Chirtoaca.
From the beginning, the AIE was hampered by con-
flicts that diverted attention, including that of the 
EU, from reform. A constitutional crisis arose from 
EASTERN PARTNERSHIP COUNTRIES
BELARUS
UKRAINE
MOLDOVA
GEORGIA
ARMENIA
AZERBAIJAN
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its repeated failure to secure the qualified parlia-
mentary majority to elect a new president, which 
had triggered early elections in 2009 and 2010. This 
changed in 2012, when Dodon and other MPs broke 
with the PCRM and voted for a pro-European com-
promise candidate, Nicolae Timofti.5 The new pres-
ident was an apolitical candidate on whom the AIE 
leaders settled because he lacked a power base and 
could not threaten their interests.
The relationship between the coalition’s leaders was 
rivalrous. Filat and Plahotniuc toyed at times with 
allying with the PCRM against each other. In nego-
tiations after the 2010 elections, Plahotniuc pres-
sured Filat with parallel negotiations with the PCRM. 
Sergey Naryshkin, the head of Russia’s Presidential 
Administration, travelled to Chisinau to seal a deal 
between the PDM and PCRM, but in the end was 
used to extract concessions for the PDM when the 
AIE was renewed. (This is probably one of the roots 
of Plahotniuc’s strained relationship with Russia.) 
When the EU intervened in favor of maintaining the 
AIE,6 party leaders also learned that, once Russia en-
tered the game, geopolitics pushed transformational 
concerns into the background and they gained lever-
age over the EU.
From the beginning, the AIE leaders carved up con-
trol over supposedly independent institutions.7 
Plahotniuc established control over the General 
Prosecutor’s Office and the National Anti-Corruption 
Center.8 This laid the ground for his control over law 
enforcement that gave him the edge over his com-
petitors. Plahotniuc realized that power could de-
pend more on control over the institutions of justice 
than on winning elections.
The first years of the AIE saw some important re-
forms, in particular on police violence and human 
rights. There was more pluralism and a more vibrant 
civil society. Most of civil society and the West-
ern-minded part of the population initially were op-
timistic and gave credit to the AIE. This optimism 
was transmitted to many in the EU. It was fuelled by 
the fact that in all the coalition’s parties decent, re-
form-minded personalities strove toward a Euro-
pean future. A capable team of Moldovan diplomats 
5 Witold Rodkiewicz, “Russia’s strategy towards Moldova: continuation or change?,” OSW Commentary 74, Center for Eastern Studies (April 2012), p. 3: 
<https://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/commentary_74.pdf> (accessed July 3, 2020).
6 Vladimir Socor, “Moldova Between the EU and Russia,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 8, 6, The Jamestown Foundation (January 10, 2011):  
<https://jamestown.org/program/moldova-between-the-eu-and-russia/> (accessed July 3, 2020).
7 Kamil Calus, “A captured state? Moldova’s uncertain prospects for modernization” OSW Commentary 168, Center for Eastern Studies (April 2015), pp. 3-4: 
<https://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/commentary_168_0.pdf> (accessed July 3, 2020).
8 Unimedia, “Details of the Secret Agreement of AIE,” Unimedia, November 16, 2011:  
<https://unimedia.info/stiri/detalii-din-acordul-secret-al-aie-41233.html> (accessed July 3, 2020).
led by Foreign Minister Iurie Leanca succeeded in 
convincing partners in the EU of the AIE’s commit-
ment to European values and reforms. Negotiations 
for the Association Agreement started in 2010 and 
were conducted speedily, reinforcing the narrative of 
progress in integration.
However, the hope for the future never really mate-
rialized. In areas most critical for the transformation 
toward liberal democracy, rule of law, and fighting 
corruption, reforms remained lacking or superfi-
cial. The AIE focused on symbolic deliverables – such 
as biometric passports to qualify Moldovans for vi-
sa-free travel to the Schengen area – that did not 
threaten the power or interests of its leaders or oth-
er actors within it. 
The Façade Crumbles
In January 2013, Filat challenged Plahotniuc’s con-
trol over law enforcement by forcing the resigna-
tion of the prosecutor general. Plahotniuc retaliated 
with corruption investigations on Filat and his close 
allies. The release of compromising phone calls also 
damaged Filat’s reputation. Releasing recorded con-
versations or videos of Plahotniuc’s opponents be-
came a regular occurrence, indicating the extent to 
which surveillance was used for political purposes 
and blackmail.
Filat and Plahotniuc each sought the help of the 
PCRM, whether in dismissing Filat as prime minister 
or Lupu as speaker of parliament. When the conflict 
seemed to benefit the PCRM, and the EU and Unit-
ed States pushed for compromise, they agreed to re- 
establish a coalition. But Filat had lost much of his 
public support and Plahotniuc apparently dealt his 
final blow when the Constitutional Court blocked 
Filat’s reappointment as prime minister. This and sub-
sequent obviously arbitrary decisions clearly made it 
hard to doubt Plahotniuc’s control over the court.
Leanca became prime minister and Igor Corman, the 
most credible pro-European PDM politician speaker 
of parliament. The crisis had all but destroyed trust 
in the coalition – and collaterally damaged the EU’s 
image. With its two most credible figures at the fore-
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front, the coalition managed to regain confidence in 
the West and with a majority of voters. 
However, Filat and Plahotniuc still controlled the le-
vers of power. The government and parliament had 
little control over justice and banking – where devel-
opments proved to be most detrimental to Moldova’s 
European path. Actors from both sectors had al-
ready established the “Russian Laundromat” scheme 
in which at least $20 billion of obscure Russian ori-
gins were laundered through Moldovan court deci-
sions and banks.9
In 2014, Leanca suggested an EU mission that would 
effectively put Moldovan justice under surveil-
lance, but nothing came out of this before he and 
Corman were set aside after that year’s elections.10 
Meanwhile, the privatization of two strategic as-
sets showed that coalition leaders were pursuing 
different interests. With a large share of highly non- 
transparent state-owned enterprises in the econo-
my, control over their revenues or privatizations had 
always been instrument of power. Apparently a con-
dition of the deal between Filat and Plahotniuc, one 
of the first decisions of the renewed coalition was to 
privatize the concession for Chisinau airport and to 
sell part of the shares in the state-owned Banca de 
Economii.
Opacity as well as a dubious procedure and buy-
ers turned the airport transaction into a prominent 
example for the alleged corruption of the coalition 
leaders. The Banca de Economii transaction result-
ed in a theft of unprecedented dimensions. Business-
man Ilan Shor took control of the bank as well as two 
smaller ones and apparently implemented a massive 
fraud worth $1 billion – around 10 percent of GDP at 
the time.11 This triggered a government bailout. Since 
Shor could hardly have perpetrated such large-scale 
fraud alone or concealed it from institutions con-
trolled by the coalition leaders, he was likely exec-
utor rather than mastermind. Public opinion blamed 
Filat and Plahotniuc when the extent of the fraud and 
bailout became known.12
9 Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, “The Russian Laundromat Exposed,” OCCRP, March 20, 2017:  
< https://www.occrp.org/en/laundromat/the-russian-laundromat-exposed/> (accessed July 3, 2020).
10 IPN Press Agency, “EU supports justice sector reform in Moldova by three new projects,” IPN Press Agency, November 17, 2014:  
<https://www.ipn.md/en/eu-supports-justice-sector-reform-in-moldova-by-three-new-projects-7967_1016609.html> (accessed July 3, 2020).
11 See the report on the investigation conducted by Kroll, released by parliament in July 2019: <https://www.ipn.md/en/second-kroll-report-
published-7965_1066592.html> (accessed July 3, 2020); Transparency International Moldova, “Radiography of a Bank Fraud In Moldova: From Money 
Laundering To Billion Fraud And State Debt,” December 20, 2016: <http://www.transparency.md/2016/12/20/radiography-of-a-bank-fraud-in-moldova-
from-money-laundering-to-billion-fraud-and-state-debt/> (accessed July 3, 2020).
12 Institute of Public Policy, “Barometer of Public Opinion,” November 2015, p. 52:  
<http://ipp.md/old/public/files/Barometru/Brosura_BOP_11.2015_prima_parte_final.pdf> (accessed July 3, 2020).
The Party System Breaks Up
The 2014 elections were again presented as a con-
test between the pro-European and pro-Russian 
camps, in which the PDM, PLDM, and PL again won 
the majority of seats. In reality, geopolitics was large-
ly a façade to mobilize voters and impress Western 
partners. In opposition the PCRM had taken a more 
pro-Russian stance, but after the elections most of 
its MPs joined Plahotniuc’s forces. The scene was set 
for his ascendency.
The party system had also begun to break apart. The 
PCRM softening its message on European integra-
tion opened space for political projects more depen-
dent on Russian support. Using his links to Russia’s 
leadership, Dodon took over and rebuilt the Par-
ty of Socialists (PSRM). He faced competition for the 
pro-Russian electorate from Renato Usatii, a radical 
activist who also could draw support from more ob-
scure Russian sources and presented himself as an 
anti-establishment fighter. However, Usatii’s increas-
ingly popular Our Party was banned from the elec-
tions over accusation of foreign financing. This was 
an apparent political decision, as it would be unreal-
istic to expect that the authorities would have acted 
without the decision been taken by Filat and Plahot-
niuc. Likely they judged Usatii less predictable than 
Dodon, with whom they had done business before. 
Dodon was the main beneficiary, with PSRM winning 
the most seats in the elections. The EU responded to 
the ban on Our Party only with moderately critical 
statements. Geopolitical concerns prevailed.
The PLDM was still the strongest “pro-European” 
party but mistrust had grown between Leanca and 
Filat, who became more preoccupied with each other 
than with Plahotniuc. Ousting Leanca as prime min-
ister after the elections, Filat agreed with Plahotniuc 
to establish a government with the PCRM. Together 
with the banking fraud, the extent of which became 
known at the same time, this led to an irreparable 
loss of public trust in the PLDM. 
Of the parties represented in parliament since 2010, 
at the end of 2015 only Plahotniuc’s PDM remained as 
the dominant force – one opposed by an overwhelm-
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ing majority of the people. In 2015 a succession of 
crises transformed politics in the final struggle be-
tween Filat and Plahotniuc. At one point, Filat nom-
inated Education Minister Maia Sandu, the most 
credible member of government for her record of in-
tegrity, reform and fighting corruption, to be prime 
minister, but her conditions in order to fight corrup-
tion were rejected by coalition leaders.13 Instead, the 
PLDM and PDM set up their last coalition govern-
ment, joined by Ghimpu’s PL, which lost its credibil-
ity as a result. Plahotniuc was ready to finally deal 
with Filat, who was arrested, accused of participa-
tion in the banking fraud, and in 2016 convicted to 
a long jail sentence. Irrespective of whether the ac-
cusations were true, the context and proceedings of 
the trial were clearly political. But Filat’s credibility 
had been destroyed and he had lost the confidence 
of the West. Most PCRM parliamentarians joined the 
13 IPN Press Agency, Maia Sandu, “Leaders of PDM and PL didn’t have courage to say ‘no’ to my conditions,” IPN Press Agency, August 1, 2015:  
<https://www.ipn.md/en/maia-sandu-leaders-of-pdm-and-pl-didnt-have-courage-to-say-no-to-my-conditions-7965_1021757.html> (accessed July 3, 2020).
14 Presidency of the Republic of Moldova, Moldovan president rejects new parliamentary majority’s candidate for premier office (January 13, 2016):  
<http://www.presedinte.md/eng/comunicate-de-presa/presedintele-nicolae-timofti-respinge-candidatura-domnului-vladimir-plahotniuc-la-functia-de-
prim-ministru> (accessed July 3, 2020).
PDM while a majority of PLDM ones established a 
new parliamentary group under Plahotniuc’s control. 
Around one-third of all MPs switched sides, amid ac-
cusations of bribery and blackmail.
A Country Lost to State Capture
Plahotniuc and his PDM, who won only 16 percent of 
votes in 2014, now controlled a comfortable major-
ity in parliament. Following a Constitutional Court 
ruling that obliged the president to appoint as prime 
minister a candidate supported by a majority of MPs, 
Plahotniuc tried to force Timofti to appoint him. 
Timofti did not comply, citing concerns over Plahot-
niuc’s integrity.14 Instead, he appointed Pavel Filip, a 
close associate of Plahotniuc, with whom real power 
remained and who styled himself the executive coor-
dinator of the coalition.
HOW MUCH DO YOU TRUST THE FOLLOWING POLITICAL PERSONALITIES?
A GRE AT 
DEAL OF 
TRUST
Maia  
Sandu
Andrei 
Nastase 
Igor 
Dodon
Iurie 
Leanca
Marian 
Lupu
Renato 
Usatii
Vlad 
Filat
Vladimir 
Plahotniuc
Vladimir 
Voronin
SOME WHAT 
TRUST
SOME WHAT 
DISTRUST
HIGHLY  
D ISTRUST
I  DID NOT 
HEAR A BOUT 
HIM/H ER
NO ANSWER
Source: Public Opinion Barometer, Institute for Public Policy, November 2015:
<http://bop.ipp.md> (accessed September 3, 2020)
11.8%
27.5%
15.4%
31.8%
9.1%
4.5%
21.6%
4.6%
8.3%
20.6%
13.4%
31.5%
2%
3.3%
8.7%
23.9%
15.5%
46.5%
3.1%
4%
6.3%
23.7%
19.7%
43.2%
2.5%
3.5%
4.4%
13.8%
17.5%
58.4%
2.2%
3.8%
12.9%
23.8%
11.8%
45.6%
1.5%
3.2%
5%
15.9%
14.7%
59.7%
1.9%
3%
2.4%
10.3%
81.6%
2.9%
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In all but constitutional formality, this was a “parlia-
mentary coup,”15 putting in control of parliament and 
government the leader who enjoyed the least trust 
in the electorate. Lacking democratic legitimacy and 
needing to avoid early elections, Plahotiniuc’s regime 
presented itself as the only force able to maintain 
stability and Moldova’s pro-European orientation.
A small number of PLDM MPs continued to oppose 
Plahotniuc, but Filat and his legacy had largely de-
stroyed voters’ trust in the party. After his ouster, 
Leanca built his party in opposition but, facing the 
danger of confronting him, he collaborated with Pla-
hotniuc. He even joined the government in 2017, de-
stroying his credibility.
The powerful protest movement against the bank-
ing fraud that had erupted in 2015 gained new 
strength after Plahotniuc’s power grab. The largest 
demonstrations since independence were essential-
ly pro-Western, supported widely by civil society, 
and joined by the remaining genuine pro-European 
leaders. Sandu and protest leader Andrei Nastase an-
nounced the creation of parties and demanded early 
elections. 
The protest movement provided a real chance to 
reinvigorate a genuine European course. At this 
point the EU’s position was decisive. With finances 
strained after the banking scandal and pro-European 
voters about to oppose him even more than the 
pro-Russian ones, Plahotniuc’s regime needed EU 
recognition and support for survival. In the end, con-
cerns over stability and a geopolitical turn prevailed 
in the EU, which engaged with the government and 
provided crucial budget support.
Still, the possibility that pro-Russian forces would 
join pro-European ones in the protest movement 
threatened the regime. It thus created a diver-
sion with a Constitutional Court decision declaring 
void an amendment to the constitution according 
to which presidents had been elected by parliament 
since 2000. The arbitrariness of this decision was un-
derlined by the court retaining, however, the min-
imum age requirement for presidents, with the 
15 Vladimir Socor, “Regime Change in Moldova: Accomplished but Not Irreversible,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 13, 14, The Jamestown Foundation (January 21, 2016): 
<https://jamestown.org/program/regime-change-in-moldova-accomplished-but-not-irreversible/> (accessed July 3, 2020).
16 Stanislav Secrieru, “Erase and Rewind: Moldova’s Constitutional Reform,” Commentary, European Council on Foreign Relations (April 7, 2016):  
<https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_erase_and_rewind_moldovas_constitutional_reform_6082> (accessed July 3, 2020).
17 Transparency International Moldova et al., “State Capture: The Case of the Republic of Moldova” (2017), p. 15-32:  
<http://www.transparency.md/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/TI_Moldova_State_Capture.pdf> (accessed July 3, 2020).
18 INFOTAG, “PLDM: PDM takes over the Mayors to Ensure Victory in Parliamentary Elections,” INFOTAG, January 26, 2018:  
<http://www.infotag.md/politics-ro/258775/> (accessed July 3, 2020).
19 Victor Ursu, “The mayor’s criminal files drown investment in localities,” Institute for Development and Social Initiatives “Viitorul” (May 10, 2018):  
<http://www.viitorul.org/ro/node/1435> (accessed July 3, 2020).
obvious purpose to exclude Usatii, now mayor of the 
second-largest city, Balti, and a competitor to Dodon 
for the pro-Russian electorate.16 With a presiden-
tial election due, this turned the pro-European and 
pro-Russian forces from eventual cooperation against 
Plahotniuc toward competition against each other.
Mechanisms of State Capture
Meanwhile Plahotniuc consolidated his state cap-
ture. Besides control over parliament and govern-
ment, his regime came to rest on three pillars. 
First, an effective privatization of state institutions 
controlled via a network of personal loyalties and de-
pendencies. One key element was control over pros-
ecutors and courts.17 This allowed for selective or 
manipulative application of constitutional and le-
gal provisions, and intimidation, blackmailing or re-
moval of officials or politicians. Control over local 
authorities and mayors was crucial for curtailing op-
position campaigning. In 2015 the PDM won around 
290 of around 900 mayorships. In 2017 the number 
may have been up to 700.18 Mayors who refused to 
join the regime could expect prosecution or remov-
al.19 In Balti, in 2016, Usatii was prosecuted and fled 
to Russia. The following year, in Chisinau, Chirtoaca 
was prosecuted and removed.
The second pillar was monopolization of the mass 
media and advertising market, denying revenue to 
remaining independent media. The third pillar was 
control over economic assets, which gave Plahotni-
uc vast financial superiority. His private assets were 
probably less relevant than control over state financ-
es and enterprises. It is difficult to establish to what 
extent illegal activities – rumors of which followed 
Plahotniuc since the beginning of his career – were 
involved. 
Such rumors were reinforced by the apparent lack 
of serious investigation into the banking fraud and 
an apparent association with Shor. Shor was instru-
mental in accusing Filat. He was then convicted – 
possibly as a warning to ensure subservience – but 
then his appeal proceedings were postponed. He was 
allowed to create a party and even got the integri-
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ty certificate to run for parliament in 2019. His par-
ty was in all appearance a PDM proxy targeting poor 
voters inclined to support Dodon.
The PDM had initially positioned itself as a cen-
ter-left party, trying to promote a “pro-Moldovan” 
agenda but, as Plahotniuc came to dominate it, it be-
came simply the party of power. It relied more and 
more on control over mass media, the use of adminis-
trative resources, and overwhelming financial means. 
Plahotniuc’s strategy exploited and deepened the 
geopolitical polarization of society. Using fears of 
Russia in the West and at home, he pretended to 
fight pro-Russian forces while strengthening them, 
in particular Dodon, to present himself as the on-
ly actor strong enough to prevent them from taking 
power. Plahotniuc highlighted geopolitical interests 
and conflicts while distracting from the transforma-
tional aims of European integration. He stirred up 
occasional conflicts with Russia20 while seeking to 
suppress and eventually destroy the pro-European 
opposition so that it could not challenge his claim to 
be the guarantor of Western interests.
Revival of the Democratic Opposition
The pro-European opposition, now led by Sandu 
and Nastase, had to organize itself outside parlia-
ment. With her record, Sandu represented the clear-
est alternative to Plahotniuc, while Nastase was seen 
as the most uncompromising fighter against the re-
gime. What gave them credibility and clout, and dis-
tinguished them from earlier reformers, was courage 
to confront Plahotniuc.
Nastase took the name of his new party, Platform 
Dignity and Truth (PDA), from the protest movement, 
while Sandu founded Action and Solidarity (PAS). Un-
like nearly all other parties, these were largely free 
from special interests. Former parties could only suc-
ceed by commanding media and money, hence their 
links to oligarchs, business people and their special 
interests. By destroying the party system, Plahotni-
uc created in the pro-European electorate a vacu-
um that he probably hoped to fill, but also a want for 
a different kind of leadership. These circumstances 
helped Sandu and Nastase gain voters’ attention de-
spite lacking resources usually needed for this.
The PAS and PDA were largely cut off from financial 
sources. Their supporters and activists could expect 
20 William H. Hill, “More than a Frozen Conflict: Russian Foreign Policy Toward Moldova,” Atlantic Council (August 2018), pp. 11-12:  
<https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/More_Than_A_Frozen_Conflict_ web_final.pdf> (accessed July 3, 2020).
harassment by authorities, even fabricated charges 
and prosecutions. A few TV stations were support-
ive but only survived with assistance from US and EU 
donors. Relying heavily on social media, the opposi-
tion could only reach a minority of voters directly. 
Most of the electorate got their “information” from 
regime-controlled media that ran disinformation 
campaigns on a scale unprecedented against Nastase 
and Sandu. 
Societal change also weakened support for the 
pro-European course. Massive immigration, in par-
ticular, has affected the composition of the elec-
torate and, more importantly, of the elites. While 
pro-European voters tend to be middle class, ur-
ban, better educated and opportunity-seeking, the 
pro-Russian or left-wing electorate is drawn from 
entrenched patronal sentiments in society and con-
sists of a large socially dependent clientele. For vot-
ers, “pro-European” and “pro-Russian” are largely 
just labels for two development models: one seeking 
prosperity in a Western-style liberal democracy, the 
other relief from poverty and corruption in an au-
thoritarian leader. 
The experience of past elections and opinion 
research do not yet suggest there would be a pro- 
Russian majority in any remotely free and fair vote. 
As a result of immigration, however, pro-Western 
elites have been leaving in large numbers. Combined 
with the repression by Plahotniuc, this limits the hu-
man resources available for new parties like the PAS 
and PDA. It also makes the extinction of all relevant 
pro-European parties possible. Without Sandu and 
Nastase, this might have happened in 2016. For the 
lack of any serious partner of the EU, a European de-
velopment path would likely have been lost.
A Difficult Recovery
Crucial for the survival of the pro-European oppo-
sition was that the PAS and PDA managed to co-
operate despite considerable differences, with 
the latter rather activist and focusing on anti- 
Plahotniuc protests and the former more intel-
lectual and emphasizing integrity. Their coop-
eration conveyed a willingness to rise above the 
self-interest that had characterized leaders and par-
ties. Nastase made the decisive step in endorsing 
Sandu as common candidate for the 2016 presiden-
tial election, whose support in the electorate has al-
ways been broader. Facing certain defeat, Plahotniuc 
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and the PDM withdrew their candidate Lupu and en-
dorsed her. But in reality they threw their resources 
behind Dodon, with their media running concerted 
negative campaigns against Sandu. The most prom-
inent and damaging example was the fabrication 
that Sandu promised German Chancellor Merkel to 
resettle 30,000 Syrian refugees in Moldova, which 
shortly before the election was widely and system-
atically broadcasted by Dodon´s and Plahotniuc´s 
media alike.21 Despite these attacks and a massive in-
equality of resources,22 Sandu only narrowly lost the 
election with 48 percent.
Mutual arrangements subsequently characterized 
the relationship between Dodon and Plahotniuc, 
who retained control over power. The Constitution-
al Court empowered itself to suspend the president 
if he did not consent to the promulgation of laws 
and ministerial appointments.23 As result, Speaker of 
Parliament Andrian Candu, Plahotniuc’s second-in- 
command, regularly took the president’s place and 
approved controversial decisions, after which Dodon 
would be reinstated. This appeared to be a face- 
saving solution procedure whenever Dodon would 
not take responsibility for a law or an appointment. 
Dodon knew that he could not defeat Plahotniuc and 
aimed to keep him focused on the pro-European op-
position. He may have understood the regime was 
trapped in a vicious circle in which maintaining pow-
er required ever more arbitrary action, more dele-
gitimization, and more international isolation. Dodon 
needed to survive and wait until its eventual collapse.
Relations with the EU worsened when in 2017 the 
PDM-led “coalition” changed the electoral system 
from a proportional to a mixed one with half of MPs 
elected through party lists and half in single-member 
constituencies with one round of voting. This poten-
tially favoring it also, the PSRM supported the bill, 
21 Vladimir Socor, “Moldova’s De Facto Ruler Enthrones Pro-Russia President,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 13, 196, The Jamestown Foundation (December 14, 2016): 
<https://jamestown.org/program/moldovas-de-facto-ruler-enthrones-pro-russia-president/> (accessed July 3, 2020).
22 See the filings of the candidates at the Central Election Commission under:  
<https://a.cec.md/ro/sustinerea-financiara-a-concurentilor-electorali-3180.html> (accessed July 3, 2020).
23 The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Moldova, “Decision on the Interpretation of the Provisions of Article 98 (6) in Conjunction with Articles 1,  
56, 91, 135 and 140 of the Constitution (Failure of the President to Fulfil his Constitutional Obligations)” [in Romanian], October 17, 2017:  
<http://www.constcourt.md/public/ccdoc/hotariri/ro-h2817102017ro0300f.pdf> (accessed July 3, 2020).
24 Council of Europe, Venice Commission et al., Republic of Moldova – Joint opinion on the draft laws on amending and completing certain legislative acts 
(electoral system for the election of the Parliament) (June 19, 2017):  
<https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2017)012-e> (accessed July 3, 2020).
25 Council of the European Union, Relations with the Republic of Moldova – Council Conclusions (February 26, 2018):  
<http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6280-2018-INIT/en/pdf> (accessed July 3, 2020).
26 Armand Gosu, “Invalidating the rightfully elected mayor of Chisinau threatens the regime of oligarch Plahotniuc,” Studia Politica: Romanian Political 
Science Review 18 (2) (2018), pp. 293-314, pp.296-300
27 European Parliament, Resolution on the political crisis in Moldova following the invalidation of the mayoral elections in Chisinau (July 5, 2018):  
<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2018-0303_EN.html> (accessed August 29, 2020).
28 Remarks by HR/VP Mogherini on breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law in Moldova, July 5, 2018:  
<https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-Homepage/47997/remarks-hrvp-mogherini-breaches-human-rights-democracy-and-rule-law-
moldova_en> (accessed July 3, 2020).
ensuring a broad majority in parliament though the 
parties supporting it had only gained 36 percent in 
the elections. 
Lacking resources, their local structures harassed, 
and mostly facing PDM-controlled local administra-
tion, opposition parties were far more disadvantaged 
competing in constituencies. In addition, the draw-
ing of constituencies reduced the impact of the di-
aspora vote, which overwhelmingly supported the 
pro-European opposition, while increasing the im-
pact of votes in pro-Russian Transnistria. When the 
law was adopted over the objections of the Venice 
Commission of the Council of Europe24 and of the EU, 
the latter conditioned future macro-financial assis-
tance on democratic standards.25 However, that its 
warnings were ignored shows that the regime was so 
entrenched that the EU had lost leverage.
The 2018 Chisinau Election
The conflict with the EU escalated further in 2018. 
After being removed from office and replaced by a 
Plahotniuc-controlled administration, Chirtoaca for-
mally resigned as mayor of Chisinau, thus forcing an 
early election. It was won by Nastase, the PAS-PDA 
candidate. However, decisions by courts and the 
election commission annulled the election and de-
nied a new poll before the 2019 local elections.26 The 
justification – Nastase having campaigned on elec-
tion day by calling for voters to go vote – was ob-
viously absurd, possibly deliberately. After a clear 
defeat for him, Plahotniuc possibly felt a need to re-
assure his followers that power would not depend on 
elections any more. In response, the European Par-
liament directly condemned the “state capture” in 
Moldova,27 while the European Commission final-
ly froze micro-financial assistance and scaled down 
further contacts with the government.28
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The parliamentary elections of 2019 were the most 
unequal and least democratic so far, with means 
massively in favor of the PDM and against the 
pro-European opposition. The PAS and PDA ran as 
the ACUM (“Now”) bloc. Fake news, discrediting cam-
paigns, and aggressive speech against the opposition 
had intensified for months to prepare the ground. 
Polls in which record high numbers of respondents 
said they did not feel free or only to a small extent 
to express their opinions on the country’s leader-
ship, indicated that a climate of intimidation had in-
creased since the launch of the EaP.29 Administrative 
resources and pressures were allegedly used system-
atically to urge citizens to vote for the PDM.30
29 International Republican Institute, Public Opinion Survey: Residents of Moldova, December 5, 2018 – January 16, 2019, p. 21:  
<https://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/iri_moldova_poll_december_2018-january_2019.pdf> (accessed July 3, 2020).
30 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Republic of Moldova: Parliamentary 
Elections, 24 February 2019, ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report (May 22, 2019), pp. 12-14:  
<https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/8/a/420452.pdf> (accessed July 3, 2020).
31 Compare the filings of the political parties on the website of the Central Elections Commission: <https://a.cec.md/ro/sustinerea-financiara-a-
concurentilor-electorali-4219.html>; on two referenda, which the government organized on the same day, the PDM officially nearly spent as much for 
campaigning as on the parliamentary election: <https://a.cec.md/ro/sustinerea-financiara-4221.html> (accessed July 3, 2020).
The overwhelming campaign spending on behalf of 
the PDM and its proxies also had large impact. Ac-
cording only to the official figures, the ratio between 
the money deployed by the PDM and the Shor Party 
and that by ACUM was more than 40 to 1.31 The real 
figures were likely much higher in favor of the PDM 
and Shor, as it is doubtful that the election com-
mission enforced the code against the PDM and its 
proxies, while support by mass media was also not 
included. In one the poorest countries in Europe, 
with an electorate largely disillusioned by a long ex-
perience of corruption prevailing and unfulfilled 
promises, many voters may be willing to trade their 
vote for even small material benefits. The purpose of 
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the Shor Party was allegedly to buy votes from the 
poorest citizens, usually part of the PSRM’s elec-
torate, including by setting up a network of “social 
shops” for pensioners and other vulnerable people.32
After the elections, Plahotniuc still controlled 40 MPs 
out of 101, together with the Shor Party and a few in-
dependents close to him. That two of the latter could 
win the Transnistria constituencies indicates a deal 
with the region’s leadership. Plahotniuc’s strategy 
aimed at compelling Dodon into collaboration to es-
tablish a new government, but the latter played for 
time. An apparent stalemate seemed to drag on un-
til June, when the deadline after which the president 
could call a new one passed.
In March it became apparent that Russia opposed any 
cooperation by Dodon with Plahotniuc.33 This posi-
tion was made clear by a visit by Russia’s deputy prime 
minister and special envoy for Moldovan affairs, Dmi-
try Kozak, who urged the PSRM to cooperate with 
ACUM to replace Plahotniuc. Moscow’s reasons were 
likely not primarily geopolitical. According to Kozak, 
Plahotniuc had offered to turn Moldova toward Rus-
sia and even to resolve the Transnistria conflict with 
a federal model, which would cement Russia’s influ-
ence over Moldova.34 In view of Plahotniuc’s interests 
and alternatives – which pointed to such a turn soon-
er or later – Kozak’s claim appeared not implausible. 
Plahotniuc remaining in power might also have suit-
ed Russia’s geopolitical interests, as it promised the 
destruction of the pro-European opposition and like-
ly kill any chance of Moldova returning to a European 
path. But, in any case, in a Plahotniuc-Dodon arrange-
ment, the latter would have been the junior partner, 
and Moscow had to expect Plahotniuc might take over 
the PSRM like earlier “partners.”
Regime Change
The EU was also ready to support an ACUM-PSRM 
arrangement to replace Plahotniuc. It was a coinci-
dence and based on different agendas that it came 
to support the same alternative as Russia. Within the 
EU, Plahotniuc’s regime had become increasingly 
recognized as the more immediate danger to its val-
ues, interests, and prestige in the EaP countries. Al-
32 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Republic of Moldova: Parliamentary Elections (February 24, 2019), p. 12.
33 Vladimir Socor, “Does Russia Seek Regime Change in Moldova?,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 16, 47, The Jamestown Foundation (April 3, 2019):  
<https://jamestown.org/program/does-russia-seek-regime-change-in-moldova/> (accessed July 3, 2020).
34 Leonid Bershidsky, “Moldova Is the One Thing Russia and the West Agree On,” The Moscow Times, June 12, 2019:  
<https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/06/12/moldova-is-the-one-thing-russia-and-the-west-agree-on-a65970> (accessed July 3, 2020).
35 Council of Europe, Statement of the Secretary General on the Situation in the Republic of Moldova and the Venice Commission (June 9, 2019):  
<https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/-/statement-by-the-spokesperson-of-the-secretary-general-on-the-situation-in-moldova> (accessed July 3, 2020).
36 Council of Europe, European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), Republic of Moldova: Opinion on the constitutional situation 
with particular reference to the possibility of dissolving parliament, Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 119th Plenary Session (Venice, 21-22 June 
2019) (June 24, 2019): <https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2019)012-e> (accessed July 3, 2020).
though the EU commissioner for neighborhood and 
enlargement, Johannes Hahn, was in Chisinau at the 
same time as Kozak, the two sides acted separately. 
These visits triggered negotiations between the PS-
RM and ACUM. Soundings between both sides had 
been taken for some time but were marked by lack 
of trust and posturing. The position of the PSRM 
remained ambiguous until the end as it had been 
sounding out the PDM too about a common govern-
ment. To what extent these negotiations were sin-
cere and failed because Plahotniuc did not make 
enough concessions or were a deceit to prevent him 
launching a preventive strike is an open question. 
ACUM needed to overcome its strong reservations 
concerning Dodon’s geopolitical positions and past 
arrangements with Plahotniuc. Two factors were de-
cisive. First, ACUM came under increasing pressure 
from its support base to prioritize Plahotniuc’s re-
moval. Second, the pro-European opposition was 
already largely at the end of its rope. It was no ac-
cident ACUM meant “Now.” “Now or never” was the 
prevailing sentiment. There was no expectation the 
exhausted opposition would survive much longer 
should Plahotniuc stay in power. 
When a breakthrough was reached on the formation 
of an ACUM-PSRM government, Plahotniuc launched 
a counter-strike. In an emergency decision, the con-
stitutional court ruled that the deadline for forming 
a government had passed, and declared all further 
decisions by parliament and the appointment of the 
new government by the president invalid.
It was the most obviously arbitrary decision yet. Even 
if the court’s disputed calculation of the deadline had 
been correct, the constitution was clear that the 
president could dissolve parliament but was under 
no obligation to do so, nor did it contain any provi-
sion preventing parliament from voting in a new gov-
ernment after this time. The secretary general35 and 
the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe 36 
assessed the court’s decision to be arbitrary and un-
constitutional. The Constitutional Court was appar-
ently just instrumental in an attempted PDM coup.
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In the following week, the previous government 
clung to power, threatening the president and the 
new government. The Constitutional Court declared 
the president suspended and former Prime Minister 
Filip to be acting president. He in turn declared par-
liament dissolved and early elections. Broad, early in-
ternational support, including by the EU and many 
member states, for the parliament and the new gov-
ernment may well have prevented a violent crack-
down by Plahotniuc. With the PSRM and ACUM 
threatening to call for a mass rally against his regime 
and under increasing international pressure, joined 
by the United States, Plahotniuc gave in and the PDM 
handed over control of government. He and Shor fled 
the country.
An Uncertain Future
Sandu headed the new government, with Nastase as 
vice prime minister and interior minister. The PS-
RM got the position of speaker of parliament, first 
in line for the succession to the presidency, provid-
ing Dodon with reassurance against suspension from 
office. But he ceded control over government large-
ly to ACUM. The PSRM agreed to some reforms, in-
cluding returning to a proportional-representation 
electoral system, anti-corruption measures, and in-
vestigations in high-scale corruption and the recent 
coup attempt. Having since his election increasing-
ly promoted a “balanced” foreign policy, Dodon and 
the PSRM committed themselves to the Association 
Agreement. Nevertheless, common ground between 
the two sides remained limited with regard to geo-
politics and reforms. Their cooperation was expedi-
ent and its duration was doubtful from the beginning.
The Sandu cabinet was likely the cleanest and most 
reform-minded government Moldova ever had. 
However, the immigration-caused shortage of suit-
able persons to replace those compromised or un-
qualified was a serious impediment. The EU resumed 
macro-financial assistance, while the IMF agreed ad-
ditional aid. Sandu made justice reform her priority; 
the heavily compromised Constitutional Court judg-
es and prosecutor general were forced to resign. The 
procedure for appointing new judges was controver-
sial, as Sandu promoted an impartial selection while 
the PSRM in particular pushed political nominees, 
but it produced a court no longer under the control 
of a political camp. 
The power sharing initially advantaged ACUM. Gov-
ernment offices provided it for the first time with a 
platform to communicate directly to a majority of 
voters. Sandu’s popularity rose, helped by the strong 
recognition and support she got from the EU and 
United States. This raised PSRM concerns about her 
as a contender in the 2020 presidential election. Un-
like ACUM, Dodon had an alternative: with Plahotni-
uc gone, large parts of the PDM were now apparently 
seeking collaboration with him. Fear of Plahotniuc 
waned and Dodon became emboldened; he started 
to criticize the government and increasingly strove 
for more power.
The November 2019 local elections produced a set-
back for ACUM when Nastase narrowly lost the 
contest for mayor of Chisinau. Anti-Plahotniuc and 
geopolitical sentiments that earlier mobilized cen-
ter-right voters had lost salience, while the winning 
PSRM candidate proved more effective in address-
ing local issues. As Nastase had attacked Dodon, his 
remaining in government was about to become an 
issue of conflict. Sandu faced the prospect of a con-
frontation in which Dodon would demand a major 
reshuffle that would have made the government sub-
ordinate to him or ended it. At the same time, the 
selection of a new prosecutor general had turned in-
to a conflict. Existing legislation left the final deci-
sion to the Supreme Council of Prosecutors and the 
president. Therefore, Sandu also faced the pros-
pect that a politically controlled candidate would 
again be appointed. Three days after the elections 
her government passed draft legislation that gave 
the prime minister right to co-decide the appoint-
ment of a prosecutor general under a provision in 
which a draft becomes law if parliament does not 
adopt a motion of no confidence. Thus she confront-
ed Dodon with whether he wanted to continue coop-
eration with ACUM.
The answer came when a majority of PSRM and PDM 
MPs toppled the government and installed a new 
one. The new prime minister, Ion Chicu, had been 
minister of finance in the Filip government and be-
come a Dodon advisor after Plahotniuc’s fall. Initial-
ly the PDM was not represented in the new cabinet, 
which was presented as “technocratic.” In substance, 
it seemed to have traded collaboration for protection 
of its business model and vested interests, of its in-
fluence in institutions, and from prosecution. 
Coalition with the PDM invited the question wheth-
er Dodon would make himself the heir to Plahotni-
uc’s state capture and even take over the networks 
the latter used to control institutions. In particular 
in the media, with apparent Russian support, Dodon 
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showed similar tendencies toward monopolizing 
control.37 Discrediting campaigns against compet-
itors, Sandu in particular, also showed similar pat-
terns. However, there has been no abuse of abuse of 
justice and repression on a similar scale so far. And 
Dodon still faced constraints to his power.
Dodon denied Sandu, his only serious challenger for 
the presidency, the public outreach of government. 
The longer he remained in power, the likelier he 
could establish control over the PDM or considerable 
parts of it. The PDM now faced a scenario similar to 
that the PCRM and PLDM did in 2015, when large 
parts of these parties were absorbed into Plahotni-
uc’s system. Dodon could have threatened the PDM 
with early elections should they deny him support, 
but these are prohibited in the last six months of a 
presidential term, and in view of the coming election 
his interest in keeping control over the resources of 
government was stronger. In the short run, this pro-
vided leverage to the PDM.
In February, Filip – Plahotniuc’s successor as party 
leader – negotiated with Dodon a formal represen-
tation of the PDM in government, giving the im-
pression of a coalition cabinet. At the same time, a 
group of mainly Plahotniuc loyalist MPs around Can-
du, which had been sidelined in the dealings with 
Dodon, split from the PDM and created the Pro Mol-
dova parliamentary group. Threatening Dodon’s ma-
jority, they aimed to prevent him from becoming 
over-powerful and playing all other actors against 
each other as well as to maintain as much indepen-
dence and to extract as many concessions as pos-
sible. Released videotapes seemed to confirm that 
Dodon took support from Plahotniuc in the past and 
that he knew of the annulment of the 2018 Chisi-
nau election in advance.38 Apparently in retribu-
tion, the prosecutor general finally opened a criminal 
case against Plahotniuc. Veaceslav Platon, the al-
leged mastermind of the Russian Laundromat jailed 
in 2016, was released and started making accusations 
against Plahotniuc.
Geopolitically, Dodon moved himself further into a 
corner. As his credibility in the EU had largely de-
pended on his cooperation with Sandu and Nastase, 
37 Hendrik Sittig and Darija Fabijanić, “Russian Dominance on Moldovan Media Market prevails, (Country Report, Media Programme South East Europe)”, 
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (March 2020):  
<https://www.kas.de/en/web/medien-europa/laenderberichte/detail/-/content/russian-dominance-on-moldovan-media-market-prevails> (accessed July 3, 2020).
38 “MP Iurie Renita has published another fragment of the negotiations of the president with the former leader of PDM” [in Romanian], INFOTAG, May 18, 2020: 
<http://www.infotag.md/politics-ro/284869/> (accessed July 3, 2020).
39 Cristina Gherasimov and Vadim Pistrinciuc, “The 2020 Presidential Election: Key challenges for the electoral process in Moldova,” Policy Brief, Institute for 
European Policies and Reforms (April 2020):  
<http://ipre.md/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Policy-Brief_2020-Presidential-Elections_Key-challenges-for-the-electoral-process-in-Moldova_final_
edit_28.04.2020_ENG.pdf> (accessed July 3, 2020).
and with the new government promising little guar-
antee for serious reform, the EU again effective-
ly froze support and high-level contacts. Dodon lost 
the chance to promote his “balanced” foreign policy 
and his discourse turned more pro-Russian and Eu-
roskeptical. For financial help, he relied on a shady 
loan from Russia that was eventually prohibited by 
the Constitutional Court.
In the coronavirus crisis, Dodon emphasized Chinese 
and Russian while depreciating the assistance of the 
EU and in particular of Romania. His reactions to the 
crisis often seemed erratic, with himself downplay-
ing risks while parliament declared an emergency 
and the government enacting a far-reaching lock-
down. Support for Dodon weakened because of his 
crisis management that has been less efficient than 
in other European countries in containing the virus 
while financial constraints have limited efforts for 
economic recovery.
The Challenge Ahead
No reliable majority seems to exist in the current 
parliament. Some MPs were induced to switch from 
to the PDM to Pro Moldova, raising the question of 
whether the government could survive a motion of 
no confidence. Pro Moldova commands considerable 
media and other resources, suggesting the back-
ground influence of Plahotniuc. The power of Fil-
ip has waned in the PDM, whose coherence remains 
unclear. So far, the Shor Party has been considered 
too compromised to work with or depend on. Thus, 
even if Dodon would not command a majority, it 
would be quite challenging to organize an alterna-
tive one. 
The presidential election will be the next major 
crossroads for Moldova, with Dodon and Sandu as 
the serious contenders. For Sandu it will again be an 
uphill battle marked by huge inequalities in access to 
resources and media.39 ACUM also faces fragmenta-
tion: protesting against Plahotniuc was the essence 
of the PDA’s identity and with him gone it suffered 
a loss of purpose. The alternative to Plahotniuc’s re-
gime – in terms of democratic and good government, 
rule of law, and European integration – came to be 
more associated with Sandu and the PAS in the elec-
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torate. With their poll ratings diverging, the PDA be-
came increasingly concerned with distinguishing 
itself from the PAS and Sandu, and Nastase has stat-
ed his intent to run for president. 
Until the election, politics will be characterized by 
maneuvers between the different political forces. 
Superficially, geopolitics will continue to play a role, 
as Pro Moldova and the PDM may still claim to be 
pro-European. As the PDA expressed willingness to 
take responsibility for forming a new government, 
Candu endorsed the initiative. However, it should 
be expected that the remnants of Plahotniuc’s sys-
tem – Shor and Pro Moldova in particular – will try to 
protect their business models, including from pros-
ecution. These interests may temporarily support a 
government not controlled by Dodon, but they have 
been irreconcilable with the values of the PAS and 
PDA as well as with the EaP.
In effect, the fall of Plahotniuc resulted in the sur-
vival of relevant pro-European parties, stopped the 
worst abuses of power so far and re-established 
more political pluralism as three major political 
camps now compete for power. However, as a direct 
consequence of Plahotniuc’s rule, Russian influence 
is stronger and more entrenched than ever. So is the 
influence of corrupt interests and networks. More 
pluralism should not detract from the fact that 75 
percent of MPs have been associated with interests 
that proved to be opposed to the EaP’s geopolitical 
or transformational goals. Therefore, the success of 
the EaP in Moldova is anything but certain. Not un-
like in 2016, remedying this situation would take not 
only a presidential election but at least another early 
parliamentary elections. 
LESSONS LEARNED
Three struggles have determined the political evolu-
tion of Moldova. The most obvious one was over its 
geopolitical direction. However, the geopolitical vec-
tors promoted by political leaders were often super-
ficial, based on seeking legitimacy and support from 
abroad. The second was between leaders for power 
and control over economic assets and institutions. 
This occurred across geopolitical camps, but in par-
ticular in the pro-European one between Vlad Pla-
hotniuc and Vlad Filat until 2015. Similar struggles 
will likely continue in the relationship between Ig-
or Dodon and the PDM, Pro Moldova and the Shor 
Party. The third struggle was between reform and 
status quo interests, largely within the pro-Euro-
pean camp. Until 2015 it was marked by consensus- 
seeking rather than conflictual approaches to pro-
moting reform and ended with proponents of reform 
leaving or squeezed out of the established pro- 
European parties and the latter’s de facto destruc-
tion. Since 2016 this struggle has continued with the 
resistance against Plahotniuc, with Andrei Nastase 
and Maia Sandu as a new type of leaders and a new 
type of parties largely free from special interests.
The EaP can only succeed in the third struggle. In 
any case the outcome can only be decided in a strug-
gle, not by deliberation. So far, the conditions for 
a success of the EaP – in terms of progress toward 
a stable democracy based on the rule of law and a 
market economy, supported by the electorate and 
elites – have deteriorated. To improve its chances of 
success, the EU should focus on power more than in-
centives, assess actors according to their respective 
business model instead of pro-European claims, pri-
oritize transformation over geopolitics, and accept 
active domestic involvement in Moldova.
Incentives versus Power
The incentives of the EaP did not lead to intend-
ed reforms in Moldova. They may have even worked 
against change as leaders used the promise of inte-
gration to compensate for not delivering reforms. 
The integration incentive was so strong that gov-
ernment coalitions sought public approval by nam-
ing themselves after that goal, and employing the 
output legitimacy of allegedly defending the Eu-
ropean course to cover a lack of democratic input 
legitimacy.
Citizens’ confidence in the EU meant that any en-
gagement with it would be understood as it offer-
ing approval. This allowed leaders to dissipate reform 
pressure that would otherwise result from corrup-
tion, abuse of power, and failure to deliver change. 
As the strength of EU soft power indicates, Moldo-
van society did not lack in support, or need a stron-
ger incentive, for reforms.
However, EU soft power went along with a belief that 
integration automatically led to reform. This was a 
myth, but it encouraged hopes that it would be suffi-
cient to promote rapprochement with the EU instead 
of taking on corrupt interests. This weakened the re-
solve of reformers to fight corruption. The promise 
of future salvation made abuses more tolerable for it 
suggested they were transitional, yet increased tol-
erance made abuse more sustainable and kept salva-
tion from materializing.
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In Moldova’s case, the key difference with the trans-
formation through EU enlargement in Central and 
Eastern Europe is not the lack of the membership 
perspective but that powerful veto players resisted 
the EaP’s goals. The attractiveness of integration in-
cited these to present themselves as pro-European 
to consolidate power while their interests were 
served by not delivering reforms. There is no reason 
to assume that any incentive by the EU would have 
fundamentally altered their interests or power.
In fact, since EU incentives, especially membership, 
are too inflexible instruments to be offered or with-
drawn based on who would benefit from them, they 
would always have benefitted status quo interests. 
Had a membership perspective been offered while 
Plahotniuc was in control, this would have helped 
him. The hypothesis that a membership perspective 
would make a difference is based on a questionable 
analogy with earlier enlargements, and likely more 
based on coincidence than causality. The experience 
in Moldova challenges the assumption of a relation 
between the strength of the EU’s commitment be-
hind integration and that of reform efforts.
The EaP worked quite well in generating incentives, 
but the key weakness has been in enforcing compli-
ance, a challenge not encountered in enlargements. 
As a result, EU soft power proved vulnerable to ex-
ploitation by corrupt interests that turned it against 
its purpose. In Moldova, a lack of hard power has 
been the shortcoming of the EaP. The key challenge 
has been how to overcome the veto power of cor-
rupt interests.
Business Models versus Pro-European Claims
The business models of Moldova’s political actors 
should be taken more seriously than their geopoliti-
cal claims in assessing the situation and establishing 
EU policies. Anti-European models cannot become 
pro-European ones even if they claim to do so. In 
such a case, this often proved to be a façade for dif-
ferent or even contradictory intentions. Thus, it is 
crucial to understand the business model of political 
actors – the interests and structures that determine 
how and to what ends they operate.
Whether a business model is compatible with Eu-
ropean integration has only partly, and sometimes 
superficially, been linked to the promotion of geo-
political vectors. As conflicts between Russia and 
the EU in the post-soviet space are also a compe-
tition between political systems, pro-Russian forc-
es cannot usually be expected to undertake reforms 
toward EU models of democracy and rule of law. It 
does not follow, however, that this can be expected 
from actors claiming to be pro-European. The worst 
abuses have been committed under Plahotniuc by a 
“pro-European” regime and justified by this stance.
Plahotniuc’s business model can be understood as a 
typical oligarchic one (even if his singular dominant 
position makes the term a bit contradictory.) Many of 
its elements can also be found in varying degrees in 
other pro-European and pro-Russian ones. It is char-
acterized by the mutually dependent control over 
political and economic power. It aims to remove this 
control from effective democratic or market compe-
tition. The political goal is to establish veto power or 
dominance. The economic goal is usually rent seek-
ing, effectively aiming to redistribute properties and 
revenues for the benefit of the oligarchic structure.
The instruments employed include monopolization 
of economic assets or revenues, capture of state in-
stitutions, in particular those providing access to 
means of coercion – like law enforcement and jus-
tice – or to finance, and control over mass media and 
parties. Within these structures, power is organized 
by networks in control of key positions or institu-
tions, fuelled by corruption, based on personal loyal-
ties and dependencies, reinforced by a vulnerability 
to prosecution and blackmailing, accountable only to 
the leader, and overriding constitutional, legal and 
institutional responsibilities.
Control over media and administrative and financial 
resources made it possible to curtail the democratic 
process without interfering much in voting in elec-
tions. It raises the threshold for competition and lim-
its it to actors commanding similar resources, and 
therefore likely susceptible to similar interests. In 
effect, and in particular with Plahotniuc, the strate-
gy was to control those elected. When this reached 
its limits, it was augmented by the removal of oppo-
nents from elections, meddling with the electoral 
code, or the annulment of elections. It was only the 
discrediting of established leaders and voters’ desire 
for clear alternatives that enabled parties such as the 
PAS and PDA to become major contenders without 
commanding much resources or being controlled by 
corrupt interests.
A system such as Plahotniuc’s is inherently contrary 
to a liberal democracy with its distinctions between 
private and public, economic and political interests, 
and politics and the state, as well as its division of 
powers. Dependent on rules, properties and rights 
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being subject to power, it is opposed to the rule of 
law. It is not an accident that it invites comparisons 
to “Mafia systems.”40 The magnitude of allegations 
regarding the regime’s involvement in organized 
crimes such as the banking fraud points in a simi-
lar direction.
As a consequence, neither Plahotniuc’s regime nor 
its “pro-European” orientation was sustainable. Eco-
nomically it provided no development model for the 
country, depending on the control, exploitation, and 
redistribution of wealth for the benefit of its own 
networks. This self-serving model could not main-
tain itself on the long run in a poor, increasingly iso-
lated country with a trade balance in which imports 
are more than twice the size of exports and heavi-
ly dependent on remittances and funds from abroad.
Lacking democratic legitimacy and unlikely to ac-
quire it, the regime needed to become more repres-
sive to stay in power. At the same time, Plahotniuc’s 
power was informal and rested on a weak founda-
tion, depending on the belief in and fear of his power 
as well as in his ability to maintain it. When this be-
lief was challenged, the regime crumbled, which like-
ly would have happened sooner or later.
Since the business model of Plahotniuc and the 
PDM was irreconcilable with EU standards, its “pro- 
European” orientation was never substantive. The 
regime would have become untenable the more 
contradictions with the EU revealed its lack of le-
gitimacy and its isolation abroad and at home. Since 
the business model was reconcilable with a pro-Rus-
sian vector, however, it was to be expected that the 
regime, or its remaining structures after a collapse, 
would seek refuge in a geopolitical turnaround.
It was a consequence of its business model in con-
junction with the wish to survive that the PDM took 
Dodon’s side after Plahotniuc’s fall. The PDM, its 
splinter parties, or proxies may also eventually try to 
negotiate siding with the PAS and PDA. But as long 
as the former do not undergo a fundamental change, 
it should be expected that this would be tactical to 
strengthen their negotiating position with either and 
ultimately to protect their business model. As long as 
this model remains, their interests require opposing 
the Western development of the country.
40 Kálmán Mizsei, “It’s high time for Plahotniuc to leave the scene”, New Europe, June 15, 2019:  
<https://www.neweurope.eu/article/its-high-time-for-plahotniuc-to-leave-the-scene/> (accessed July 3, 2020).
Transformation versus Geopolitics
Just as over-reliance on incentives had a con-
trary effect on reforms in Moldova, concerns about 
pro-Russian forces coming to power rather brought 
this than preventing it. The geopolitical polariza-
tion of society was a challenge as pro-Russian forc-
es threatened to interrupt the country’s European 
course and to anchor it in Moscow’s sphere of influ-
ence. Though pro-Russian parties were always more 
so in opposition (when they depended more on Mos-
cow’s support) and aimed for balance when in gov-
ernment (and needing EU money), they could hardly 
be relied on to deliver on reform.
In addition, there was always a concern that with a 
pro-Russian government, Moscow would engineer 
a settlement of the Transnistria conflict by a fed-
eralization that would tie Moldova into its zone of 
influence – although this faced considerable obsta-
cles, including contradictory interests in Chisinau 
and Tiraspol and widespread reservations in soci-
ety. However, a far graver problem was the way the 
pro-Russian threat was exploited by corrupt actors 
within the “pro-European” camp to distract from a 
lack of reforms and to refocus the attention of EU 
actors and the pro-Western electorate on geopoliti-
cal concerns.
Among EaP countries, Moldova has likely the most 
geopolitically polarized society. But pro-Russian 
forces did not gain traction primarily because of 
their strength or the influence and interference of 
Moscow. The pro-Russian turn was the direct conse-
quence of the European cause becoming associated 
with corruption and abuse of power. Only the sur-
vival of a pro-European opposition prevented it from 
becoming irreversible.
Even from a narrow geopolitical point of view, the 
pro-Western orientation of Plahotniuc and the PDM 
proved to be a Trojan horse. Since the pro-European 
opposition posed the more fundamental threat to its 
business model and its self-legitimation, Plahotni-
uc drove it close to extinction. At the same time, he 
strengthened the PSRM as the stronger the Russian 
threat appeared the easier he could appeal for sup-
port in the West. When a pro-Russian leader like Us-
atii emerged whom the “pro-European” leaders did 
not consider to be under their control, he was re-
moved. Dodon stayed to become the predominant 
leader of the pro-Russian camp because Plahotni-
Moldova in the EU's Eastern Partnership: Lessons of a Decade
19No. 6 | September 2020
ANALYSIS
uc believed he could control him and helped him win 
the 2016 presidential election. 
In the short run, geopolitical interests within the 
EU contradicted its transformational goals, whereas 
in the long run both can only succeed together. By 
contrast, in its geopolitical competition with the EU, 
Russia can prevail without delivering change. It can 
rely on business models such as Plahotniuc’s turn-
ing in its favor sooner or later. The success and cred-
ibility of the EU, on the other hand, depends on its 
ability to deliver change. However, fear of instability 
and a geopolitical turn raised the EU’s tolerance lev-
els, reduced the reform pressure on allegedly pro- 
European governments and provided the logic for 
supporting Plahotniuc’s regime in 2016. This illus-
trates that supporting a government for short-term 
geopolitical reasons can backfire on the longer run 
by losing more ground to the geopolitical opponent. 
Placing immediate geopolitical concerns over trans-
formation meant choosing short-term appearance at 
the expense of sustainability.
Plahotniuc only appeared to prevent a takeover by 
pro-Russian forces, while under him Moldova shifted 
from a Western democratic path to an Eastern oli-
garchic one. The country was lost for the EaP with 
his power grab in 2015–16. As long as his rule last-
ed, the weaker the pro-European forces and the 
stronger the pro-Russian forces became. At any ear-
lier time, a takeover by pro-Russian forces was not 
only less likely but would have also met with stron-
ger checks and balances. Thus, a worst scenar-
io would not have simply been a takeover of power 
by pro-Russian forces, but one without any serious 
pro-European opposition left.
Most importantly, time has been against the pro-Eu-
ropean cause. The business model that Dodon and 
the PSRM represent is sustainable and not depen-
dent on its leader. Even if both disappear, a replace-
ment would evolve for this model has a constituency, 
is backed by Russia and its media, and can rely on 
external support and connections to special interests 
to keep it financially afloat.
Pro-European parties can also rely on a strong con-
stituency but in any other respect their model is far 
less sustainable. Financially starved, without much 
media control and access, and depleted by the im-
migration of pro-Western elites, it is questionable 
whether a serious replacement for the PAS and PDA 
would emerge should they disappear. Genuine, rel-
evant pro-European forces can still become extinct, 
which would kill any chance to return Moldova to a 
European path for the foreseeable future.
Despite the formal progress in relations with the EU, 
political and socioeconomic developments in Moldo-
va suggest it has moved further away from a Europe-
an course since the launch of the EaP. Immigration 
is increasing the share of the population that forms 
a socially dependent clientele and depleting the 
pro-Western elites needed to implement reforms 
and good governance. Rent-seeking, oligarchic, or 
monopolistic structures neither attract nor generate 
much investment or innovation, increasing the econ-
omy’s dependence on remittances and aid, which 
may not be sustainable on current levels.
The EU’s geopolitical goals can only be realized if 
these trends are reversed. If not, Russian interests 
will likely prevail over Western ones. But Plahotni-
uc’s regime may have also allowed a glimpse into an-
other possibility: that Moldova may descend into a 
kind of Mafia state, providing a safe haven for money 
laundering, illegal trafficking, and other sorts of or-
ganized crime.
Between Non-Interference and Domestic  
Involvement
The Eastern Partnership requires fundamental do-
mestic reforms in Moldova. At the same time, it has 
kept to the principle of non-interference in domestic 
affairs. In earlier EU enlargements, this was not much 
of an issue as the EU and local elites largely shared 
the same goals – enlargement was about consolidat-
ing democracy and the rule of law. Moldova, however, 
has remained in a hybrid state, with oligarchic inter-
ests, corrupt networks, and strong clientelistic struc-
tures with a leaning toward authoritarian leadership 
gaining control over large parts of the political sys-
tem. For these interests, networks and structures, the 
EaP’s transformational goals were not about demo-
cratic consolidation but regime change.
Moldova committed itself to these goals in the Asso-
ciation Agreement with the EU. Formally, compliance 
has been its sovereign choice. In reality, however, 
non-interference was an illusion. For the electorate, 
relations with the EU were not primarily an issue of 
foreign relations but of domestic development. For 
its supporters, the EU promised to bring its model of 
democracy, rule of law, and prosperity. Against the 
backdrop of generally high dissatisfaction with and 
mistrust in institutions and politicians, many voters 
relied on the EU more than on their leaders to deliv-
er progress.
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The EU became perceived as a guarantor providing 
a seal of quality to actors who could present them-
selves as its partners. This was unintended but un-
avoidable since any interaction with the EU would be 
presented or read as a signal of support. The signif-
icance of the “European” label’s role in legitimizing 
governments and in elections campaigns indicates 
its impact. Support and interventions from EU actors 
helped on several occasions to establish and stabilize 
governments and “pro-European” coalitions. 
Adherence to non-interference limited the EU large-
ly to intergovernmental relations. This advantaged 
actors in power, who could instrumentalize these 
as even meetings between official or leaders could 
be read as support and transfer legitimacy. The EU 
faced the further problem that media ownership pre-
vented it from controlling its message. During Pla-
hotniuc’s regime in particular, local media presented 
as expressions of support meetings that EU or mem-
ber-state officials intended to convey criticism. In 
the later stage of his regime, the EU therefore re-
duced contacts with the government and communi-
cated its criticism by increasing meetings with the 
pro-European opposition.
With the EaP, the EU became de facto a domestic po-
litical actor in Moldova. For a considerable part of 
the electorate, it shared the responsibility for deci-
sions of “pro-European” governments. This experi-
ence suggests a choice for the EU between giving up 
the political agenda of the EaP – leaving responsibil-
ity for domestic developments to local actors – and 
becoming more assertive and interfering.
Concerns about providing ammunition to anti-EU 
propaganda and to accusations of imperialism have 
led to caution. However, the EU would face these in 
any case. In the end, a defensive approach will not 
mitigate such accusations from Russia or pro-Rus-
sian forces or their impact, and it may allow corrupt 
interest to continue hijacking the EU’s credibility 
while preventing reform. Far worse from being ac-
cused of imperialism is for the EU to be and to ap-
pear ineffective.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The experience of the Eastern Partnership in Moldo-
va shows that its weakness is reliance on incentives, 
rather than a lack thereof. EU soft power proved vul-
nerable to hijacking by veto players who hid their 
true interests by claiming allegiance to the Europe-
an cause. Since they were the key opponents of po-
litical reforms, the EaP’s shortcoming was lack of 
means and readiness to coerce them to keep their 
commitments. 
Prioritize Transformation
The EU should prioritize transformational goals over 
geopolitical concerns. In nearly every instance when 
the latter meant propping up a “pro-European” coa-
lition or government rather than risk a takeover by 
pro-Russian forces, this only traded short-term ap-
pearance for long-term loss of substance, strength-
ening corrupt and pro-Russian forces. Corruption 
disguised in European colors made matters worse, 
adding discrediting to obstruction. The EU should 
not be too wary about instability and protests as they 
can create leverage over corrupt interests. In this 
game, who worries less gains leverage over who wor-
ries more.
Without significant progress toward rule of law and 
against corruption, no other reform can have a sus-
tainable effect and real power will not be controlled 
by any reliable partner of the EU. However, serious 
reforms toward democracy and the rule of law are 
also a vital threat to powerful corrupt interests that 
will seek to resist, thwart, or bypass them. Frustra-
tion with this situation led the EU to seek out suc-
cesses in more technical reforms, such as visa 
liberalization or DCFTA implementation. The prob-
lem with this is that progress gets measured more by 
incentives delivered than by goals achieved. Without 
a readiness to target them, corrupt veto players will 
largely set the agenda.
With a parliament in which 75 percent of MPs now 
represent forces close to Russia or whose inter-
ests are contrary to the EaP’s goals, the question is 
not how to keep Moldova on a European path, but 
whether it can be returned to it. This suggests pri-
oritizing the survival of genuine democratic forces as 
a precondition of progress in every area of relations 
with the EU. This includes access to party financing, 
media access and ownership, and freedom for civil 
society. The emphasis must be on freedom from re-
pression and restrictions, which can be expected to 
be used against the opposition. Under Plahotniuc, 
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laws justified as fighting Russian propaganda were 
directed against the remaining independent media. 
Russia has been far more effective in supporting its 
cause and allies than the EU has. Spending a few mil-
lion euros on political parties and media can gener-
ate more political impact than dozens of millions of 
euros in EU budget support to the government. So 
far, EU and US donors have helped some indepen-
dent media survive but this aid was far more limited 
and defensive than the means employed by Plahot-
niuc or pro-Russian forces to establish their con-
trol over mass media. EU actors will need to become 
more competitive in this area.
Respond Earlier, More Flexibly, and More Toughly 
The EaP’s “more for more” approach should be aug-
mented by a more flexible “less for less” one in case 
of regress or stagnation, with readiness to ques-
tion and suspend gradually the framework of rela-
tions, including the Association Agreement. Within 
this framework and by providing financial aid, the 
EU has transferred legitimacy to Moldovan govern-
ments, even if they represented interests opposed 
to the EaP’s aims. The commitments on democra-
cy and the rule of law under the Association Agree-
ment remain unfulfilled. Still, the EU has seemed 
more concerned about “losing” the agreement than 
local actors do. Pro-Russian actors questioned it 
when in opposition but whether this was more than 
just politics is questionable. Even Russia has de facto 
accepted the agreement and DCFTA will stay, likely 
because it would not want or know how to compen-
sate for the economic losses otherwise. The situation 
looked quite favorable to Moscow’s interest already 
under Plahotniuc, with status quo interests in pow-
er preventing any real rapprochement with the EU 
and Russia strengthening its foothold in politics on 
the cheap, while the EU kept Moldova financially 
and economically afloat with a preferential trade re-
gime and budget support. The EU should develop a 
mechanism for a unilateral partial suspension of the 
agreement, in particular bilateral formats and mech-
anisms, in order to be able to send a clear signal by 
withdrawing legitimacy from local political actors.
The EU should also be ready to employ sanctions 
earlier, more flexibly, and more toughly. As politi-
cal realities in Moldova differed so much from those 
within the EU, it naturally took a learning curve (at 
least it did for the author) for EU decision-makers 
to understand the intricacies involved. However, by 
41 “Public Designation, Due to Involvement in Significant Corruption, of Former Moldovan Official Plahotniuc”, U.S. Department of State, January 13, 2020: 
<https://www.state.gov/public-designation-due-to-involvement-in-significant-corruption-of-former-moldovan-official-plahotniuc/> (accessed July 3, 2020).
2015–16 enough should have been known about Pla-
hotniuc’s system to put a stop to his power grab. This 
could have likely been achieved had the EU respond-
ed then by freezing financial aid and political con-
tacts as it did after the annulment of the Chisinau 
election in 2018. In 2018, these measures had lost ef-
fectiveness as they lagged behind Plahotniuc’s con-
solidation of power. As their effectiveness depends 
on creating a threat that outweigh other interests, 
sanctions have to be proportionate to the entrench-
ment of power. 
Circumstances in 2016 already justified further sanc-
tions even. The Russian Laundromat or the banking 
fraud bear comparison with other major corrup-
tion schemes, including those targeted in the Unit-
ed States and other Western countries by Magnitsky 
or similar legislation. Early this year, the US govern-
ment designated Plahotniuc a major perpetrator of 
corruption.41 This would have been justified in 2016 
too. The apparent absence of serious investigations 
and prosecutions in the banking fraud raised ques-
tions about complicity of authorities and political 
leaders. The EU could have demanded an interna-
tional investigation with its own participation into 
the fraud, while imposing sanctions against persons 
implicated or obstructing investigations.
Extend EU Intelligence, Conditionality, and  
Involvement
The EU and its member states should build up their 
intelligence and prosecution capacity. The strug-
gle for the success of the EaP is also an intelligence 
struggle closer to the experiences of the Cold War 
than to earlier enlargements. The ability – which 
most member-state intelligence services seem to 
lack – to track money flows would be crucial to un-
derstand interests, connections and dependencies 
in local politics as well as to monitor and dismantle 
corruption schemes. Since a transformation of Mol-
dova will partly depend on the decriminalization of 
politics, the EU and its member states should devel-
op their capacity to investigate and prosecute ma-
jor corruption cases. Money-laundering schemes 
and the banking fraud involved banks in the EU, rais-
ing the question of EU jurisdiction. Prosecuting ring-
leaders within the EU could be a game changer.
The EU should extend its conditionality and in-
volvement to all stages at which reforms could be 
frustrated, from legislation to implementation. EU 
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conditionality has improved significantly with expe-
rience. Initially based on standards local actors by-
passed easily, financial aid became increasingly tied 
to more concrete legislation. However, EU involve-
ment may also need to include the choice and supply 
of key personnel implementing reforms and legisla-
tion, in particular in the selection of judges, prosecu-
tors and key personnel in other institutions. Moldova 
has a shortage of experts willing and qualified to 
hold public office in a proficient, independent way. 
The EU could deploy missions to assist in or monitor 
the implementation of reforms and the functioning 
of institutions. In this respect, experts have suggest-
ed “sharing of sovereignty” as a requirement for the 
EaP’s success.42 
Previous examples of this range from the exten-
sive EULEX mission in Kosovo, which initially had a 
strong mandate for building the justice system, to 
the EURALIS one in Albania that supports justice 
reform, including the vetting of judges and prose-
cutors. In Moldova, EU missions could provide spe-
cific expertise in designing justice reforms, leading 
to more targeted conditionality; surveillance of ju-
dicial procedures in order to increase transparen-
cy and accountability as well as to inhibit abuses; 
evaluation, training and selection of magistrates to 
promote changes of personnel based on integrity, 
meritocracy and independence; and participation in 
investigations, prosecutions and trials, in advisory as 
well as executive roles. 
EU budget support can be made conditional on, and 
partly help in, increasing pay to make officials fi-
nancially more independent, while the EU can also 
insist on a role in selecting key personnel. EU involve-
ment can provide trust in procedures, compensate 
for shortages in human resources and encourage re-
form-minded personalities to apply for public offices. 
Whether the role of EU missions would be executive 
or advisory will likely be less relevant than the read-
iness of the EU to take up and back up their con-
clusions. It would remain the sovereign choice of 
Moldova’s government to accept such missions, but 
the EU could treat this as a sign of whether it is willing 
to honor its obligations. The most crucial question will 
be in the end to what extent the EU is ready to impose 
serious consequences if commitments are not met.
42 Dumitru Minzarari and Vadim Pistrinciuc, “A Problem Shared: Russia and the Transformation of Europe´s Eastern Neighbourhood,” Policy Brief, European 
Council on Foreign Relations (April 2020):  
<https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/a_problem_shared_russia_and_transformation_of_europe_eastern_neighbourhood.pdf> (accessed July 3, 2020).
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